Issue:
May 2024 | Japan Media Review
Plans for the next section of the Hokuriku Shinkansen are mired in regional friction
The newest extension of the Hokuriku Shinkansen super-express train opened for business on March 16. The extension runs from Kanazawa in Ishikawa Prefecture to Tsuruga in Fukui Prefecture and includes five other stations: Komatsu, Kaga Onsen, Awara Onsen, Fukui, and Echizen-Takefu, of which only Echizen-Takefu is completely new, with the others connecting to existing stations. The previous extension of the Hokuriku Shinkansen, from the city of Nagano to Kanazawa, opened in March 2015. The shinkansen network now has a presence in Fukui Prefecture, which was one of the main goals of the Hokuriku Shinkansen. Eventually, the line will extend to Osaka, providing a second shinkansen line between Tokyo and the Kansai region.
An article by Hiro Ogawa that appeared March 13 on the website Impress Watch explains some of the "demerits" of the new extension, the main one being the change in status of former West Japan Railway Company (JR West) lines to "third-sector" enterprises, meaning that they are now separate railroads that have to fend for themselves financially. The Hokuriku Honsen, which used to be the main line in the region, has been divided into two railway companies, the IR Ishikawa Tetsudo, which runs from Kanazawa to Daiseiji with no overlap with the shinkansen, and the Hapi Line Fukui, which runs from Daiseiji to Tsuruga in parallel to the shinkansen. Previously, passengers who traveled between Osaka and Kanazawa took the Thunderbird limited express, and those who traveled between Nagoya and Kanazawa used the Shirasagi limited express. These two lines have been truncated, with both terminating at Tsuruga instead of Kanazawa. According to Ogawa, the transfer to or from the new shinkansen at Tsuruga is inconvenient.
This inconvenience could become a problem, since Fukui Prefecture, the heart of the Hokuriku region, has always had a strong relationship with the Kansai region, both economically and industrially, and Fukui residents are afraid the new shinkansen will lead to a gradual deterioration of this connection.
In March, Yomiuri TV looked at the effects of the opening of the extension on people in the Kansai region. So far, the line has more benefit for passengers from eastern Japan who wish to go to Hokuriku. Passengers from Osaka going to Kanazawa now have to pay about ¥1,600 more than they would have with the Thunderbird and transfer at Tsuruga, which involves a long walk through a connecting corridor with confusing signage. The total journey, not counting transfer time, is 22 minutes shorter. Nobuyuki Baba, the leader of Nippon Ishin no Kai, the most powerful political party in Osaka, has said that people from Hokuriku will stop going to Osaka for recreation and choose Tokyo instead, so he wants the final leg of the Hokuriku Shinkansen finished as soon as possible.
To explain how this development came about, Ogawa looks at the history of the shinkansen, which first opened in 1964 as the high-speed link between Tokyo and Osaka via the Tokaido route, which travels through Japan's most heavily industrialized areas. Plans for such a line were being discussed as early as the Meiji Era (1868-1912). The reason it took so long for these plans to be realized is that, at the time, there were many regions in Japan that were not served by any railways at all, and building a local railroad infrastructure was considered a priority. During the early 20th century, the military became more involved in railway infrastructure, and after the war, this infrastructure, along with the country in general, was in ruins, so the shinkansen became a national project that nevertheless had to contend with the rise of a society based on automobiles.
But the Tokaido Shinkansen turned out to be very successful, providing impetus for other shinkansen lines that reached further in all directions from the capital. Each region demanded their own super-express, but the Tokaido Shinkansen remained the main artery, and worries arose as to what effect any damage to the line would have on the country. As a result, alternative routes were planned, one of which was the Hokuriku Shinkansen, which would connect Tokyo to Osaka via the Hokuriku region. The first leg of the line went from Takasaki Station on the Joetsu Shinkansen line in Gunma Prefecture to Nagano, the capital of Nagano Prefecture, in 1997, a year before the Nagano Winter Olympics. The next part would extend into the Hokuriku region proper but took much longer because of a cautious attitude on the part of JR West, which would be in charge of operations once the line extended to the Hokuriku region. The main problem was cost. Initially, the plan was to build the line along the Japan Sea using existing train tracks, which were narrower than shinkansen tracks. The fastest express trains could travel on regular tracks was 160km/hour (current shinkansen can travel up to 300km/hour). Local governments insisted on a real shinkansen, so eventually the central government decided to lay dedicated shinkansen tracks from Nagano to the Hokuriku region.
JR West still wasn't convinced, as construction was being done in piecemeal fashion from the eastern end of the line. This meant that until the line was firmly established in the Hokuriku and Kansai areas, most of the passengers would be travelling to or from Tokyo and eastern Japan, so most of the revenues for the line would accrue to the East Japan Railway Company (JR East). JR West wouldn't start making real money from the line until it extended to Osaka. It would also probably lose revenue on its existing local rapid express trains covering the Hokuriku region.
So JR West came up with its own set of conditions for the Hokuriku Shinkansen: the entire route from the Tokyo metropolitan area to Osaka should be opened at the same time; local lines rendered redundant by the shinkansen should be made into third sector operations; cargo transportation must be maintained; urban transportation in the cities of Toyama, Kanazawa, and Fukui should be fortified in order to maintain stable demand; and property taxes should be reduced for facilities owned by JR West.
The second condition was perhaps the most important in that as new shinkansen lines have been built, the local lines they supplant or supplement have usually been made redundant and often do not remain solvent, thus negatively affecting residents who rely on those lines as important means of transportation, since the shinkansen doesn't stop at stations served by the local lines. By insisting that these lines be made third-sector railways, JR West wants to remove them from its balance sheets.
However, the one condition that was non-negotiable for the parties building the line was the first. The extension to Kanazawa went into operation as soon as it was completed. Both the central government, which builds the shinkansen, and the relevant local governments wanted to start construction once they had secured the necessary land, so stations were opened as soon as they were finished. This approach means the route from Tsuruga to Osaka has yet to be determined.
At present, three possible routes are being considered: the Maibara route from Tsuruga along the east side of Lake Biwa to Maibara in Shiga Prefecture, where it connects with the Tokaido Shinkansen; the Kosei route from Tsuruga along the west side of Biwa to Kyoto, and then via Nara to Osaka; and the Obama-Kyoto route from Tsuruga west to the Wakasa region of Fukui Prefecture via Obama, and then on to Kyoto, Nara, and Osaka.
Initially, JR West supported the Maibara route due to its shorter construction time and lower costs (even though the central government pays for most of it). The cost of the Kyoto-Obama route is estimated to be three times that of the Maibara route. However, the disadvantage of the Maibara route is that it connects to the Tokaido Shinkansen, which is already saturated in terms of ridership and schedules. Consequently, Central Japan Railway Company (JR Tokai), the company that runs the Tokaido Shinkansen, opposes it. In addition, Shiga Prefecture would have to contribute money to construction even though it would accrue no foreseeable benefits, since it is already served by the Tokaido Shinkansen. Not surprisingly, Shiga is also against the plan.
A more detailed look at the proposed Obama-Kyoto route was provided by Fukui Broadcasting on April 5. Like the Chuo Shinkansen, or the maglev, currently under construction between Tokyo and Nagoya, more than 80% of the line would be underground, including the area within the city of Kyoto, where it would likely disrupt water supplies that are extremely important to the region's many sake makers. Another problem is that construction on such a massive scale would exacerbate the city's already serious financial problems. By 2017, the estimated cost of constructing the route had risen to ¥2.1 trillion, 30% of which would be borne by Kyoto. The extension was an important issue in last year's mayoral election, and the victor has maintained an ambiguous stance on the line. Moreover, Ishin no Kai is against the Obama-Kyoto route because it will take at least 15 years to build, which puts the party at odds with the ruling Liberal Democratic Party [LDP], whose Kyoto representative in the upper house, Shoji Nishida, is the route's biggest booster. He told Yomiuri TV that the central government should therefore pay for the whole extension, a move that would require a change in the law.
However, as already implied, whichever of the three routes is selected, local train lines will suffer. According to the transport industry news site Merkmal, JR West calculates that, pre-shinkansen, the trains that served the same regions the new extension passes through carried more than 29,000 passengers per kilometer per day, a very high density for the type of terrain covered. The worry is that without the passengers who once used these lines to travel outside the region – many of whom will likely use the shinkansen instead – the lines will have a difficult time supporting themselves, which means they will likely cut services, consolidate, or go out of business, thus stranding those users who rely on them for local transportation.
This, of course, is the story of the national shinkansen system, whose fundamental purpose is to connect all of Japan to Tokyo. Merkmal explains that in 1996, a panel appointed by the LDP to study the system concluded that any local lines running parallel to shinkansen lines, including express trains, would likely lose ridership to the shinkansen and become a burden on their operating railway, which is why the transport ministry will allow JR West to offload the local Kosei Line, whose tracks are currently used by the Thunderbird express and which will run parallel to the next extension, in order to “promote” the Hokuriku Shinkansen. The purpose, of course, is to save JR West from shouldering too great a financial burden by maintaining redundant local lines. But are they really redundant if they serve residents who may have no other means of local transportation? When these lines vanish, the smaller communities that count on them may be further eroded. The wider question regarding the development of the shinkansen system is whether mass transportation should be run as a profit-making enterprise or as a public service.
Philip Brasor is a Tokyo-based writer who covers entertainment, the Japanese media, and money issues. He writes the Japan Media Watch column for the Number 1 Shimbun.
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